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When several states passed legislation in the 1960's granti~g
their public employees the right to barg_ain collec~1vely with
their emplovers (e. g .. boards o[ education and city go"ern
menbl, most of these same states did not legalize the right to
,trike for the purpose of resolving negotiation impasses. In
stead. manv of these states authorized factfinding (or advisory
arbitrationi as an alternative to the strike. Fo,· those states that
have as yet not legislated in the area of public sector bargaining
\OT on\\: in a limited fashion), a careful e\ aluation should be made
ofthis and other -..tudies -;o that these -;tale legislatures do not
fall into the tr:1p of merely adopting another state's legislative
framework without first giving careful <·onsideration to its pffec0

tiveness.
In many -..talc-... factfinding 1s usually impleml•nted \\ hen union
and manag..-ml•nt negotiators are unable to tl•rminate their nl'gO ·
t1at1ons with a bilatl'ral agreement. In this case, a neutral (or
neutrals \\hl'n three persons are required) is de-..ignated to con
duct a hearing and, based upon the facts giving rise to the im
pa,-.,e, to makt• recommendation-.. to the negotiating parties for
thl n•-..olution of thl•ir differences. Thl' n'commendations , hoy,·
e\l'r, an• not binding on the nc•gotiating parties; thus, factfinding is essentially only an advisory arbitration procedure
To \\ hat le, el of elfe<'tiv em•s-.. has public se<·tor factiinding
e,olwd'' One poss1hle test of an impas-.e procedure is its ability
to I1l encourage l he negotiating partil'S to make substantial efforts al re-.oh·ing their diffc•rencl''-· and l~' if negotiations rea<'h
an 1mpa-.'>l', to produl'l' a -,ettlemenl. Initial sperulation about
tht• use of fartfincling for re-.olving puhlit· -,e<•tor intere.,t clispuu•s
and the c•arly -.,tud1l.., 1 "'hic·h anah·zed artual impasse situations
do not . l•em to ha\l' produc·ed a definitive assessml'nt. Instead,
thi, mixed n•a<·tion to fa<·tfinding's effecti" enl' s in c·omplemc•nting public sedor negotiations has generall•d sevl'ral altl'f
native impasse propo..,als. A listing of thes<' proposals \\ ould in
clud<> compu\-;ory a rbitration. mediation arbitration. the statu
tor:,- strikt> and final o lfer selertion, as well as other., which
\\ould combine one or more of thl'Sl' tools with fa<•tfinding.
Given all t hese proposals, one might be tempted to c-ondude
that factfinding has failed. But h as it"? Robert D. Hl'lsb: recent!:
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lated that " ... in t he past six years a workable labor relation
syste~ _for the p_ublic sector has gradually evolved in New Yor~
State. 0 A~cord1~g to Hel~by, t he _critics of factfinding might be
prematu'.e rn their evaluat10n of this procedure's effectiveness in
th~ pu_bhc sector._ But he goes on to say that "as experience
build rn the public sector, what we really need is less ideology
an~ mor~ res~arch. _We ne~d t~ take a hard look at what is going
on rn various experiments which have been underway in various
states for ome time.""
:\-1ethod

The analysis presented below is based on a comparison of two
separate studies of the factfinding experiences in ew York and
Wiscon..,111. The fir t study considered both states' 1960 factfindrng experiences, while the econd study considered the two
states' 1970 experiences with factfinding. The 1960's study 1
analyzed the 71 factfinding cases for the first six months of 1969
in '.\few York State and the 42 cases between July, 1966 and
June. 1969 for \Visconsin. For the 1970's study', the 53 cases in
\\'isconsin for 1971 72 were chosen while 57 case were selected
by a stratified sample in , ew York for 1972 and the last two
months of 1971. Information for both studies was obtained from
replit>s of union and management repre entatives to questionnair<-'s administered in 1969 for the 1960's study and in 1973 for
the 1970'-; study. The questionnaire in both instances were very
..,imilar and included a large number of identical questions for the
explicit purpose of comparison. For both studies, completed
questionnaires were received for over 80 percent of the cases.
Character of :\cgotiations

A comparison of the two studies indicated no ignificant
change in the amount of bargaining progress achieved by the
negotiating parties before the factfinding procedure was implemented. Over 70 percent of the parties in both studies thought
that they had made less than ubstantial progress in negotiations
prior to factfinding. The basic approach of the negotiating parties (especially management ) appeared to offer some evidence as
to why more bargaining progres was not achieved. For both
studies, a majority of the union negotiators indicated that their
management counterparts had bargained in bad faith. Whether
management negotiators are actually bargaining in bad faith in
the majority of cases or whether the unions just think so, the effect on negotiation progress would appear to be negative.
The questionnaire for the 1970's study included two additional
questions which we re not asked in the 1960's study. One question asked the parties whether their negot iating position wa af-
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fected by the possibility of using ~he factfinding procedure. The
intenlofthis question was to see 1f the pa:lles_m1ght have_had a
tendency lo incorporate the poss1bh• ut1hza_t1on of factfinding
into their bargaining strategy. uch a pos_s•b~hty appeared _to
exist ince more than 50 percent of the parties in b_oth states
dicated that factfinding has some influence on their negotiating
position, and more than 30 percrnt of the rw York respondents
indicated thal the effecl was moderatr to substantial.

m

The other question (which was not mcludrd in the rarlier ques
tionnaire) asked the parties whether they withheld any negoll
ating proposals or offer., in anticipation of factfinding. \\'hil<• 75
percent of the negotiating parties indicat<•d that they had not
withheld offers. a comment by a union negotiator seemed to d1
mm1sh the 1mportanre of the responses to this question. In com
menting on his negative ans,, t>r, he indi<·ated that t'OUntt>roffer-.
are sometimes "ithheld. In addition to this comm<•nl. O\'er 60
percent of a sample of Nev. York Stal<' factfinder-. in anothN
study indicated that th<• negotiating part1e-. ,, ithheld bargaining
propo al or offer-. in anticipation of factfincling.' ,\n ab-.<•m·e of
offer or counteroffers ma large number of ca'-<'" v.ould he l'On
s1 trnt with thl' above finding that the negotiating part1e., mah
formal propo.,als and pPrhap., a fc,, <·onrr.,-.100-., but do not u.,
ually achie,e ...uhstantial negotiating progre.,., bt•fore the impl<•
mentation of the fact finding prol'Pdure
Fact[inder'<; Recomme ndations

6,

Fort he I970's -,t udy. om• or both of t ht• nPgotiat ing partie., rt'
J('('ll'd the fal·tfindl'r·., r<·l·ommPndation., m
pNc«.>nt of tht•
l'a..es, as l'ompar!'d to :19 p<'rl'Pnl for the 1%0'., .,tudy Thi" .,iza
hh• lnl'r<•a.,<• m thl' r<'Jel·t1on ratt· can largt•lv be attributed to the
nt·gollatmg partie., in '\;t•,, York. ::-uch a high rcje<'l1on ratt>
along,, ith thl• prev1ou-,ly c1tPd ah.,t•nt<' of -,uhstantial negotia
lion progn•ss 111 the maJor1ty of <·a-.ps would t<.'nd to reinforcl' the
po,1uon taken by thos<• t•xperts m the puhh<· .,N•tor that lwltt>vl' a
greater iamiliarit) ,, ith fat·tfinding dot•s not nN'l'""anly pnhan<·e
thl' pr()('(•dure's effe<·ti\'em•ss or promot<• bilatpral npgotiatlons.

Oi..,pute Re..,olution
Even though thP n•jet·tion rat<• for the factfinder·., recom
mendations increasl'd, mutual agrPement were still e\'entuallv
con~luded in the great majority of cases. AC'cording to the nego
tiatmg parue in both stales, mutual agreements were reached
for both tudies in over 80 percent of the ca <'S in which one o r
both of th~ parties had previously rejected the factfinder's rec
ommendat1ons. For those cases in the 1970' study where a
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mut ua l agreeme nt was not reached, two were resolved by a leg.
islative body, six by t he public employer , and one un ion disbanded.
Compar ing such a low initial acceptance rate fo r t he factfinder's recommendations with a rather high per centage of
mutual agreements suggested that ar. increasing amount of hard
bargaining occured after the factfinder issued his report, and
that even greater stre s was placed on this post-recommendation phase of the impasse procedure. For both studies t he influence of the factfinder and his recommendations during the
post-recommendation phase of the impasse procedu re appeared
to be considerable . The negotiating parties ex pressed
moderate to substantial confidence in their factfinder in 75 percent of all cases studied, and the parties eventually reached
mutual agreements that in two-thirds of the rejection cases were
moderate to substantial approximation of the factfinder's recommendations. Thus, it seems that even though his recommendation might be initially rejected, a competent factfinder can
have a significant impact on ubsequent negotiations, either
through his report being a guide for an agreement and/ or
through his po t -recommendation efforts. In fact, several union
and management representative went so far as to say that the
factfinding procedure is only a good as the factfinder.

L

Post recommendation bargaining al o appeared to be encour•
aged to some extent by a degree of trike activity. trike activity was defined a actual strikes and explicit strike threats that
were acknowledged by management. There wa little chan_ge,
however. in the incidence of trike activity for the two studies:
strikC' activity occurred in abot1t one or four rejection ca es.

A nalysi;,
.\)though a large percentage of the impa se ca es whi~h utihzt>d faetfindmg resulted in mutual agreement , the c1rcumstanC'es under which the agreements were reached appear to ~e
somewhat different than was originally anticipated when this
dispute procedure was adopted in the public -;ector. :\lore exper·
ience with public sector bargaining does not seem to have ~nhanced the amount of negotiation progre bet ween the parues
before the implementation of the fact find mg procedure, and the
factfinder's recomm1:-ndations have been increa ingly ubject to
rejection. The..,e obc;ervation eem to eriously que tion whe·
ther factfinding has been able to encompa a ufficient degree of
finality to adequately sub titute for the trike. And of tho e who
expressed an opinion in the 1970's tudy, eighty - ix (86) perce~t
of the union re pre entative and forty eight (48) percent of their
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management counterparts indicated that factfinding in public
employment was not an adequate substitute for the legal r ight to
strike.
Conclusion
Instead of adding yet another recommendation to the already
growing list of intr icate impasse procedures that have r~cently
been proposed in the literature, it seems more appropriate to
conclude this study by reporting the preferences of t he negotiating part ies fo r settling th eir interest disputes. For this purpo e the par ties were asked: "Given your choice, how would you
prefer to ettle negotiation impasse in the public sector?" It is
interesting to note that no single procedure received overwhelming support from either union or management negotiators. Un ion respondents mentioned binding arbitration more
frequently, while management representatives indicated a preference for factfinding. But for all parties in both states, factfinding's preference rating was only 22 percent. This failure of
any particular impas e procedure to receive anywhere close to
majority support from the negotiating parties emphasizes once
again the necessity of careful study and evaluation of alternatives before legislating in the area of public sector bargaining.
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